Louisiana Law Review
Volume 74
Number 3 Spring 2014

Article 10

5-1-2014

Recent Developments: Louisiana Class Actions
Blaine G. LeCesne

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Blaine G. LeCesne, Recent Developments: Louisiana Class Actions, 74 La. L. Rev. (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol74/iss3/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Recent Developments: Louisiana Class Actions
Blaine G. LeCesne*
I. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
The determination of whether a purported class action meets the
requirements for class certification under Louisiana’s class action
procedures has long been plagued by uncertainty, engendering
inconsistent certification rulings, misconstrued precedents, and
vague evidentiary standards for applying the class action
prerequisites. Class certification analysis has also been untethered
from any overarching policy directives concerning the appropriate
level of scrutiny to be applied or the presumed preference for class
certification when courts are confronted with close or complex
questions. In two recent cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court not
only brought much needed clarity to the class certification analysis
but also made clear that usage of this unconventional litigation
procedure should be judiciously authorized and limited to claims
that arise from a common cause or disaster in mass tort cases.
A. Price v. Martin
In Price v. Martin, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review whether the lower courts correctly applied the
commonality requirement in certifying a class action filed on behalf
of a class of 4,600 property owners who allegedly suffered damages
resulting from the operations of a wood-treating facility.1 Plaintiffs
filed suit against various owners of the facility, which was primarily
engaged in the production of creosote-treated railroad ties.2
Plaintiffs named three different owners who operated the facility
over the 60-year period in question as defendants.3 The petition
alleged that each of these defendants engaged in environmentally
unsound practices, including failing to remediate spills at the
facility, failing to contain creosote drippings, runoff, and overflow at
the facility, and allowing neighboring residents to use trimmings
from treated wood for cooking and heating.4 According to plaintiffs,
Copyright 2014, by BLAINE G. LECESNE.
* Donna and John Fraiche Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola
University College of Law; B.A., Columbia College; J.D., Columbia Law School.
1. Price v. Martin, 79 So. 3d 960 (La. 2011).
2. Id. at 964.
3. Id. The defendant–owners operated the facility at varying times between
1940 and 1999. Id.
4. Id.
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these practices allegedly caused the release of substantial amounts of
hazardous
and
toxic
substances
including
creosote,
hexachlorobenzene, and pentachlorophenol contaminating the soil,
sediment, groundwater, and buildings in the adjacent communities
where they reside.5 Plaintiffs brought claims for nuisance and
negligence seeking compensatory and exemplary damages for
physical injury resulting from increased risk of disease, property
damage, and diminished property values.6
In response to plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the district
court certified a class comprised of all property owners who owned
property within a one- and one-half-mile radius of the facility from
1944 through the present.7 The Third Circuit affirmed the district
court’s class certification despite noting several potential problems
that would likely result in conflict, rather than alignment, of interests
among the plaintiff class, including the exceptionally lengthy period
over which plaintiffs claimed harm, different ownership of the facility
during the period, and putative class members who were both past
and current landowners.8 Notwithstanding these misgivings, the
appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in certifying the class, assuaged by the trial court’s ability
to modify or recall the class at any time prior to deciding the merits
and the Louisiana Supreme Court’s prior stated preference for
maintaining class actions when construing its prerequisites.9
In granting certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme Court sought to
review not only whether the lower courts properly determined that
this case satisfied the requirements for class certification but also
whether their analysis in doing so was sufficiently rigorous.10 At the
outset, the Court delineated the guiding principles Louisiana courts
should follow in determining whether an action meets the
requirements for class certification under Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 591.11 First, the Court noted that to the extent the
5. Id. at 965.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 966.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Article 591 provides a two-tiered analysis for class certification. Subsection
A sets forth five “threshold prerequisites” that must be met: (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law
and fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representatives are
typical of those of the class; (4) the representatives will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class; and (5) the class may be defined objectively in terms of
ascertainable criteria. In addition to satisfying these absolute prerequisites, under
Subsection B, the class proponents must satisfy any one of several additional
requirements depending on the type of class action submitted, which, in this case,
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class certification requirements of article 591 parallel those of its
federal rule corollary, Rule 23, Louisiana’s class certification
analysis is appropriately informed by federal jurisprudence
interpreting Rule 23.12 The Court next clarified the plaintiffs’ burden
of proof on the requirements of article 591, noting that it is more
than the mere burden of pleading satisfaction of the requirements.13
Rather, the class proponent has the considerably more strenuous
burden of producing factual evidence that affirmatively
demonstrates that the prerequisites for class certification have been
met.14 Moreover, the general rule that courts should err in favor of
maintaining class actions does not displace the “rigorous analysis”
required in determining whether the prerequisites to class
certification under article 591 have in fact been satisfied.15
The Court next took aim at the two specific requirements under
article 591 that it considered problematic in this case. The first was
the prerequisite under article 591(A) that mandates that the party
seeking class certification show that there are questions of law or
fact common to the class.16 At the certification hearing before the
district court, plaintiffs posited that the commonality requirement
had been satisfied by one factual issue common to all class
members: “whether defendants’ off-site emissions caused property
damage to the residences in the area surrounding the plant.”17 The
Louisiana Supreme Court, however, rejected this contention,
explaining that satisfaction of the commonality prerequisite requires
more than the mere existence of common questions in general;
rather, the party seeking class certification must demonstrate that
each individual class member’s claim can be resolved by reference
to a common nucleus of operative facts.18 For mass tort claims such
as these, each individual claimant must be able to prove, through
common evidence, that defendants breached the applicable standard
of care and that defendants’ conduct was the cause of plaintiffs’

was the requirement under 591(B)(3) that common questions of law and fact
predominate over individual issues and that a class action is superior to other
adjudicative methods. Id. at 967–68.
12. Id. at 967 n.6.
13. Id. at 967.
14. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)).
15. Id. (citing McCastle v. Rollins Envtl. Servs. of La., Inc., 456 So. 2d 612,
616 (La. 1984)).
16. Id. at 969.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2551; Dupree v. Lafayette
Ins. Co., 51 So. 3d 673, 682–83 (La. 2010)).
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individual harm.19 As detailed below, after reviewing the
uncontested facts in this case, the Court easily concluded that neither
the issue of individual breach nor individual causation could be
resolved on a class-wide basis by reference to common facts.20
Regarding the issue of individual breach, the Court pointed to
several circumstances that made it impossible for each class member
to prove a breach of duty by defendants based on the same law and
facts that any other class member would use to prove breach.21 The
Court noted that the alleged forms of contamination resulted from
three different owners who, independently of one another, engaged
in varying operations that released different pollutants at unspecified
times over a 66-year period.22 During this period, there were
substantial changes in the law regarding the applicable liability
standards23 and the availability of exemplary damages for the
conduct at issue, as well as modifications to the federal
environmental regulations governing the permissible level of
emissions for some of the pollutants involved.24 Consequently, the
factual and legal variability of proof on the issue of breach
necessarily involved “different conduct, by different defendants, at
different times, under different legal standards.”25
Similarly, the determination of individual causation was fatally
rife with proof variability issues regarding the source of the
contaminants on each class member’s property, considering the
“myriad area-wide and property-specific alternative sources of
[those substances] in the defined class area.”26 As a result, proof of
whether the alleged contaminants originated from defendants’

19. Price, 79 So. 3d at 969–70.
20. Id. at 970.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. For example, liability for damage caused by a defective thing in one’s
custody changed from strict liability to a negligence framework in 1966 with the
enactment of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2317.1. Id.
24. Under former Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3, exemplary damages
for mishandling toxic or hazardous substances were only available for conduct
occurring from 1984 to 1996. Id.
25. Id. at 971.
26. Id. According to plaintiffs’ own experts, the multiple alternate sources of
the alleged contaminants found in the attic dust of some proposed class properties
include property-specific facts, such as whether trash was burned in a pit or barrel
on the property, whether there were home or vehicle fires on the property, whether
the property had poorly ventilated kitchens, whether the property was close to the
highway or another source of vehicle emissions, whether the residents smoked
cigarettes, or other property-specific factors that suggest contamination from
sources other than defendants’ wood-treating facility. Id. at 973.
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facility would turn on a host of property-specific variables rather
than be proven by a common core of material facts.27
Importantly, the Court also corrected the lower courts’ apparent
misapplication of its prior holdings that individual questions of
varying damages among putative class members do not preclude
class certification for lack of commonality.28 The Court explained
that causation in a mass tort class action is an essential and
substantive element of liability that requires proof by common
evidence, unlike individual issues of quantum, which do not.29 Here,
each claimant will necessarily have to rely on different facts,
applying different liability standards, to show that each defendant’s
varying emissions, during varying and independent periods of
ownership, contaminated their individual properties with substances
that could have originated from a multitude of sources other than the
facility at issue.30 Such matters present questions of causation and
liability, not damages, and substantive questions of causation and
liability demand commonality for class certification.31 Relying on its
precedent in Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc.,32 as reaffirmed in
Brooks v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,33 the Court firmly reiterated
its admonition from those cases that “only mass torts arising from a
common cause or disaster are appropriate for class certification.”34
The Court next addressed plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the
predominance and superiority requirements under article 591(B)(3),
which mandates a two-pronged showing that common questions of
law or fact predominate over any individual issues and that the class
action procedure is superior to any other available adjudicative
methods.35 The Court handily dispatched the predominance issue by
referencing its previous finding of plaintiffs’ failure to meet the
commonality requirement under 591(A).36 As the Court observed, if
plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the threshold prerequisite of
common questions of law and fact, it logically follows that such
common substantive questions will not predominate over individual
issues.37
27. Id. at 973.
28. Id. (citing Bartlett v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Chem. Servs., Inc., 759 So.
2d 755, 756 (La. 1999); McCastle v. Rollins Envtl. Servs. of La., Inc., 456 So. 2d
612, 620 (La. 1984)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 975.
31. Id. at 973.
32. 703 So. 2d 542 (La. 1997).
33. 13 So. 3d 546 (La. 2009).
34. Price, 79 So. 3d at 974.
35. Id. at 975.
36. Id. at 975–76.
37. Id. at 976.
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With respect to the superiority prong, the Court focused on
weighing the class members’ interest in individually litigating their
claims in separate actions, which is one of the dispositive factors in
determining the superiority of the class action device over other
litigation procedures.38 The Court concluded that two considerations
militated against a finding of class action superiority in this matter.39
First, the disparity in strength of claims between past and present
owners of the same property created conflicts regarding their
respective damages that would be more fairly resolved on an
individual, rather than class-wide, basis.40 Second, the fact that more
than 500 such individual claims had already been filed tellingly
illustrated the preference among putative class members to
individually control the fate of their claims.41
The Court also did not find that vindication of public policies or
legal rights justified the costs and burdens of class litigation under
these facts, particularly when individual proof is required to resolve
each proposed class member’s claim.42
In a strongly worded holding, the Court concluded that the
district court manifestly erred in finding that the commonality
requirement under article 591(A)(2) and the predominance and
superiority requirements under article 591(B)(3) were proved.43 As a
result, the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class.44
B. Alexander v. Norfolk Southern Corp.
In Alexander v. Norfolk Southern Corp.,45 the Louisiana
Supreme Court considered whether the lower courts erred in
certifying a class action arising out of a chemical spill from two
railroad tank cars in New Orleans.46 The spill released ethyl acrylic
fumes into the surrounding area, but no evacuation was deemed
necessary.47 Approximately 20 people were treated and released at
the scene for exposure to the chemical, and hundreds of others
complained of eye, nose, throat, and respiratory irritations, along
with noxious odors from the fumes.48
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. (citing LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 591(B)(3)(a) (2011)).
Id. at 976.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 977.
Id.
Id.
Alexander v. Norfolk S. Corp., 82 So. 3d 1234 (La. 2012).
Id. at 1235.
Id.
Id.
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The class action requirement under scrutiny in this case was the
predominance requirement set forth in Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 591(B)(3), which provides, in relevant part, that
“questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members”49 The Court reiterated its declarations from previous
cases that:
[T]he predominance requirement is more demanding than
the commonality requirement, because it entails identifying
the substantive issues that will control the outcome,
assessing which issues will predominate, and then
determining whether the issues are common to the class, a
process that ultimately prevents the class from degenerating
into a series of individual trials.50
Drawing from its recent decision in Price v. Martin,51 the Court
again stressed that class action certification is warranted only after a
“rigorous analysis” of “significant proof” that there is a common
question that, when determined, will resolve an issue central to the
validity of each claim “in one stroke.”52
Against this doctrinal backdrop, the Court then admonished the
district court for its less than rigorous reasoning in finding that this
case presented sufficient commonality to warrant class certification—
a finding that the district court supported solely with its summary
conclusion that resolution of all or most of the claims shared in
common the questions of whether the released chemicals and
defendant’s negligence were the factual cause of the plaintiffs’
harms.53 The Court further criticized the district court’s failure to
consider undisputed, highly probative record evidence that plainly
demonstrated that each putative class member will necessarily have
to offer different, individualized facts to establish liability and
damages.54 Specifically, the determination of whether a claimant fell
into the less than 0.1% of the population that would even be
susceptible to manifesting physical symptoms from exposure to the
extremely low concentrations of ethyl acrylate released in this case
turned on a host of individualized variables including the claimant’s
49. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 591 (B)(3) (2014).
50. Alexander, 82 So. 3d at 1235–36 (quoting Dupre v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 51
So. 3d 673, 684 (La. 2010) (internal quotations omitted)).
51. Price v. Martin, 79 So. 3d 960 (La. 2011).
52. Alexander, 82 So. 3d at 1236 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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health, medical history, and records.55 Likewise, determining the
dose of exposure in each case would depend upon variable factors
such as the location of the exposure and whether the claimant
changed locations during the course of the exposure.56 Moreover,
the damages–causation inquiry is further encumbered by the fact
that the complained-of physical irritations are common symptoms
attributable to myriad alternate causes.57 As the Court had
previously cautioned against in Brooks v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co.,58 certification of a class that required such individualized proof
of liability and damages for each claim would yield the unacceptable
result of the class devolving into a series of individual trials.59
Consequently, the Court concluded that the district court erred in
finding that common questions predominated under article
591(B)(3) and in certifying the class.60
II. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS
During the 2012 legislative session, the Louisiana Legislature
added two new articles to the class action provisions.61 One is a lis
pendens mechanism directed at minimizing the potential pitfalls of
multiple, duplicative class action lawsuits simultaneously pending.62
The other is a forum non conveniens provision specifically designed
for consideration of the most appropriate forum to hear a class
action that could have been brought in any one of several available
venues. Each of these new articles is tailored exclusively for use in
class actions, addressing the unique multi-party features of class
actions that would ordinarily preclude usage of the general lis
pendens63 and forum non conveniens mechanisms in a class action
context.64
A. Class Action Lis Pendens
Under new Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 593.1,65
when two or more purported class actions have been filed in
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
13 So. 3d 546, 560 (2009).
Id.
Id.
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 591–597 (2014).
Id. art. 593.1.
See generally id. art. 531.
See generally id. art. 123.
Id. art. 593.1.
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Louisiana courts by one or more of the same plaintiffs suing in the
same capacities against one or more of the same defendants in the
same capacities, the defendant may object by filing a declinatory
exception of lis pendens. Article 593.1 addresses two scenarios.66
Subsection (A) authorizes the lis pendens exception when the class
actions are filed in two or more Louisiana courts and arise out of a
single transaction or occurrence in the same location.67 In this
scenario, the defendant may have all the actions transferred to the
district court where the transaction or occurrence occurred.68
Subsection (B) authorizes the lis pendens exception when the
class actions involve multiple related transactions or occurrences in
different locations.69 In this scenario, the defendant may have all of
the actions transferred to the district court where the first suit was
brought.70
The class action lis pendens mechanism under article 593.1
resolves pending duplicative lawsuits differently than its general lis
pendens counterpart under article 531.71 Under article 531, when a
defendant objects to the filing of multiple duplicative suits, all but
the first filed suit is dismissed, and if the defendant does not except,
the first final judgment is conclusive of all the suits.72 Conversely,
rather than dismissing or disregarding duplicative suits, article 593.1
transfers all pending duplicative class actions to one district court for
consolidated management and consistency in resolution.
B. Class Action Forum Non Conveniens
Newly enacted Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
593.273 offers class action litigants the same option to transfer a
class action to a more convenient forum as the general forum non
conveniens provision does for more conventional litigants.74 Under
article 593.2, putative class actions involving the same transaction or
occurrence, one or more of the same plaintiffs suing in the same
capacities, and one or more of the same defendants in the same
capacities as a class action previously certified under article 591,
may be transferred to the district where the certified class action is
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. art. 593.1(A).
Id.
Id. art. 593.1(B).
Id.
See generally id. art. 531.
Id.
Id. art. 593.2.
See generally id. art. 123.
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pending.75 The transfer will occur if it is in the interest of justice and
good cause is shown, upon contradictory motion filed within 30
days of certification of the pending class action.76

75. Id. art. 593.2.
76. Id.

